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MDL DRANO: RULE 23-BASED 
SOLUTIONS TO MASS TORT BUILDUP 
MYRIAM GILLES* & GARY FRIEDMAN** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been taken as gospel, over the past quarter century, that class action 
procedures are unavailable in mass tort cases. This Article examines two distinct 
challenges to that assumption—one resting on Rule 23(c)(4)’s issue class 
procedure and the other on an innovation advanced by Francis McGovern, in 
whose honor this Article and symposium are dedicated. 
First, Rule 23(c)(4) issue-classing provides multidistrict litigation (MDL) 
courts with a uniquely potent tool for streamlining mass tort litigation while 
respecting the autonomy of individual claimants.1 The object of the (c)(4) trial is 
a judicial declaration that resolves disputed issues regarding the defendant’s 
conduct that are common across claimants. In the typical mass tort case, where 
liability turns on hotly disputed factual issues and the parties’ bargaining 
positions are polarized accordingly, it stands to reason that a unitary and binding 
determination of the defendant’s wrongdoing will help drive resolution. The issue 
judgment likewise enables the individual tort victim to press her damages case in 
a subsequent independent proceeding. Whether in state court, arbitration, or 
wherever venue may lie, the individual plaintiff will have the option of trying her 
damages case without an extensive team of lawyers, investigators and experts. 
The issue class judgment thus creates access to a manageable individual trial, 
where a single victim may be well represented by a single generalist injury lawyer 
working on a contingent fee basis. 
And yet, since the mid-1990s, the issue class tool has been regarded as largely 
unavailable in the mass tort context. Two circuit court cases in particular—In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.2 and Castano v. American Tobacco Co.3—rejected 
mass tort issue-classing in sweeping terms, casting a shadow that extends to the 
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 1.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) (“When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues.”). 
 2.  51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 3.  84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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present day. But the durability of this shadow is puzzling. As we have shown 
elsewhere, the doctrinal underpinnings of Rhone-Poulenc and Castano have long 
since unraveled.4 Most significantly, courts have now retired the canard that the 
Seventh Amendment poses a serious bar to mass-tort issue-classing, and all 
circuits now reject the requirement—which started with Castano—that common 
issues must predominate with respect to the case as a whole before a class may 
be certified to try a specific issue under Rule 23(c)(4).5 
So, why have we not seen more issue-classing in mass torts? Part of the answer 
may be that a generation of lawyers has registered the oversimplified message 
that class action procedures are non-viable in mass tort cases. But there are other 
reasons as well. For one, issue-classing is a form of bifurcation—and it is a credo 
of the plaintiffs’ bar that bifurcating liability and damages depresses recovery 
values.6 Other reasons include a belief that the current bellwether trial regime 
increases settlement values by producing the occasional blockbuster verdict, and 
a potential concern by plaintiff steering committees (PSCs) that an issue class 
judgment will impede aggregate settlement by making it too easy for individually-
retained lawyers to decline offers to settle their case portfolios and choose instead 
to proceed to trial with an issue judgment in hand. 
Whatever the reason, it is probably unrealistic in the short term to expect 
plaintiffs’ steering committees to advocate for issue class treatment. And 
defendants, for their part, invariably want to avoid a binding up-or-down verdict 
on key liability issues. As a consequence, the issue class device lacks a natural 
champion in the adversary system. But these observations tell us little about 
whether issue classes are desirable from the perspective of the MDL judge. And 
indeed, the specific concerns that the parties are likely to have with issue-classing 
are strikingly unpersuasive when viewed from the court’s perspective. As we 
argue below, from the Olympian vantage point of the judiciary, the issue class 
tool is well designed to unclog crowded MDL dockets. 
 
 4.  See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Rediscovering Issue Classes in Mass Tort MDLs, 53 GA. 
L. REV. 1305, 1322–31 (2019) (observing that, in recent years, courts have largely repudiated the 
“objections to mass tort issues classes that emanate from Rhone-Poulenc and Castano”). 
 5.  See, e.g., Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (observing that “[t]he 
historical record demonstrates that the Framers’ main objective in drafting the Seventh Amendment was 
to limit the ability of an appellate court, specifically the Supreme Court, to review de novo and overturn 
a civil jury’s findings of fact,” but that the use by trial courts of tools “such as new trials, remittitur, JNOV, 
directed verdicts, and special verdicts” is unproblematic under the Seventh Amendment “even though 
all of these invite federal trial judges to take even issues of historical fact out of juries’ hands”). Indeed, 
only four years after Rhone-Poulenc, the Seventh Circuit recognized that courts may bifurcate injury and 
liability issues consistent with the Seventh Amendment. Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 
F.3d 1117, 1126–28 (7th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Rhone-Poulenc to find that bifurcation did not violate 
the Seventh Amendment); see also Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal Prods. LLC, 896 F.3d 405, 417 (6th 
Cir. 2018) (“[If] done properly, bifurcation will not raise any constitutional issues.” (quoting Olden v. 
Lafarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 509 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 6.  See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, From Compassion to Compensation: The Effect of Injury Severity 
on Mock Jurors’ Liability Judgments, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1477, 1485 (1998) (demonstrating that 
severity of plaintiff’s injuries significantly increased both sympathy jurors felt for plaintiff and plaintiff’s 
likelihood of prevailing on liability). 
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Still, if the parties are not presently inclined to seek issue classes in mass tort 
cases even if they promote judicial efficiency and—we would argue—overall 
welfare, can we expect MDL courts to implement the practice on their own? 
Possibly. In the ongoing MDL concerning Fiat-Chrysler’s “monostable gear 
shifters” in the Eastern District of Michigan (FCA MDL),7 the idea to certify a 
Rule 23(c)(4) issue class to determine key liability facts emanated from the MDL 
judge himself, sua sponte.8 That litigation, which we discuss below in Part II, 
provides something of a test-drive for the use of (c)(4) issue-classing in MDLs, 
raising important questions including the application of Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg 
Weiss,9 which generally prevents the MDL court from conducting trials of 
transferred cases without the consent of the parties.10 
A second and very different application of Rule 23 in the MDL mass tort 
context was recently attempted by another district court in the Sixth Circuit, the 
National Prescription Opiate Litigation (Prescription Opiate MDL),11 pending in 
the Northern District of Ohio. Adopting a novel theory developed by Professors 
Francis McGovern and William Rubenstein,12 the district court in that case 
certified a “negotiation class” under Rule 23(b)(3).13 The negotiation class, quite 
unlike the issue class, is not designed to influence the conduct of litigation. 
Instead, as we discuss below in Part III, its exclusive focus is on facilitating 
“global” resolution with various defendant groups.14 And while the Sixth Circuit 
sitting en banc has recently rejected the district court’s certification of the 
negotiation class15—affirming a split panel decision16 just as this Article goes to 
print—the negotiation class concept may yet be attempted elsewhere, having 
attracted considerable academic attention and endorsement from major repeat-
player plaintiffs’ firms. In any event, the concept provides a unique vehicle for 
considering the application of class procedures in the mass tort MDL context. 
 
 7.  In re FCA US LLC Monostable Elec. Gearshift Litig., MDL No. 2744 (E.D. Mich.). 
 8.  Opinion and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class 
Action and Certifying Issue Classes, FCA US LLC Monostable Elec. Gearshift Litig., MDL No. 2744 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2019), ECF No. 492 [hereinafter FCA MDL Order]. 
 9.  523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
 10.  Id. at 38. 
 11.  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio). 
 12.  See Francis McGovern & William Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A Cooperative Approach 
to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, 99 TEX. L. REV. 73, 78–9 (2020) (“In this Article, we offer 
heterogenous class members a mechanism for cooperation, a new form of class certification that we call 
negotiation class certification.”). 
 13.  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 332 F.R.D. 532, 537 (N.D. Ohio 2019); see also Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(b)(3) (“A class action me be maintained if . . . questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members . . .”). 
 14.  McGovern & Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 73 (arguing that “if the class members could unite, 
they might increase their leverage and extract a premium from a defendant eager to settle the whole 
package of claims, with that global settlement simultaneously benefiting the defendant”). 
 15.  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 40688, at *5 (6th 
Cir. Dec. 29, 2020). 
 16.  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 2020). 
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In broad strokes, the procedure adopted in the Prescription Opiate MDL 
begins by certifying a class for the purpose of negotiating a global deal. A formula 
for the allocation of eventual proceeds is proposed by the PSC—now, class 
counsel—and, on that basis, class members make decisions whether to opt out.17 
Because the opt-out decision precedes negotiations, the defendants understand 
the scope of the class with whom they are negotiating. Their skepticism about the 
PSC’s ability to deliver on a global deal is allayed. Defendants are under no 
obligation to negotiate with the class—no more than they were with an ordinary 
PSC—but if a deal is struck with the negotiation class, then the terms are put to 
the class members for a vote. If the measure passes by super-majority, then the 
class members are bound by the agreement and its release provisions.18 Only 
those who opted out at the front end will retain their individual actions, free and 
clear of the release. And if a deal is not struck, then there is no class action for 
litigation purposes; the MDL proceeds as though the negotiation class never 
happened. 
This Article begins with a close examination of these Rule 23-based models. 
As we show in Part II, the issue class model would unclog MDLs by quickly and 
efficiently litigating major merits issues—but carries with it a substantial risk that 
plaintiffs could lose on the merits. But, as we show, this is a risk inherent in the 
adversary system—and should not give us undue pause here. Part III then 
examines the negotiation class model, which aims to achieve settlement purely 
by addressing the collective action problems created when large stakeholders 
threaten exit.19 Defendants are understandably loath to negotiate with a PSC who 
cannot speak for such large claimants, and may also worry that any deal they are 
able reach with the PSC will give these outlier plaintiffs tremendous hold-out 
leverage. The negotiation class solves for these twin dilemmas by settling on an 
allocation scheme at the front end and forcing stakeholders to exercise an early 
opt-out. 
Part IV compares and contrasts these class action-based models, which 
ultimately have little in common beyond shared roots in Rule 23. In this Part, we 
observe that a preference for one approach over the other may turn, in part, on 
the nature and facts of the given litigation—but equally important is the judicial 
 
 17.  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 332 F.R.D. at 537 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys have worked 
together to establish a public health-based settlement allocation plan, the details of which are all made 
available to the Class and public at a case website.”); id. (“At the front end, before having to make the 
opt-out decision, the class members can calculate their share of any future settlement.”). 
 18.  Id. (“At the back end, each class member will be entitled to vote (yes or no) on whether a 
proposed settlement amount is sufficient, and no settlement will be deemed accepted unless it garners a 
supermajority (75%) of those voting; here, a proposal will need to secure approval from six separate 
supermajority vote counts, reflecting different slices of the class.”). 
 19.  McGovern & Rubenstein, supra note 12 at 74 (“By establishing the contours of the class prior 
to settlement discussions, negotiation class certification would provide the defendant with a precise sense 
of the scope of finality a settlement would produce, hence encouraging a fulsome offer.”). See also In re 
Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 332 F.R.D. at 537 (“Defendants in this MDL are concerned that many 
[city and county] Plaintiffs could opt out,” so Defendants would have “paid a lot of money to settle non-
litigating claims but would still have to litigate a host of potentially significant claims”). 
08_GILLES & FRIEDMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2021  4:03 PM 
No. 2 2021] RULE 23-BASED SOLUTIONS TO MASS TORT BUILDUP 125 
philosophy of the MDL judge. To wit: if the negotiation class model represents 
the apotheosis of managerial judging,20 then the issue class takes a fundamentally 
adjudication-centric approach to alleviating docket congestion in mass-tort 
MDLs. Accordingly, we argue that the issue class approach is a more effective 
means of managing mass tort litigation, and one that enables the MDL court to 
perform the role for which it was intended. 
II 
THE ISSUE CLASS MODEL AND THE FCA MDL 
A principal insight of the issue class model is that current MDL practice is 
marked by undue aversion to binding adjudication.21 The standard bellwether 
trials are a singularly attenuated way of using the adjudicatory process to inform 
negotiated resolution.22 To be sure, big bellwether verdicts can drive settlements, 
and defendants can be expected to take notice when they lose multiple bellwether 
trials.23 But so too can the informational effects of bellwethers be murky, as when 
plaintiffs win some trials and defendants win some trials.24 Absent broad 
 
 20.  This phrase is often associated with Judith Resnik’s influential scholarship chronicling the 
modern judge’s embrace of settlement over adjudication, and the concomitant focus on “managing” cases 
rather than resolving them through the adversarial process. See, e.g. , Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982). The negotiation class offers a set of distinctly managerial tools—or 
one could even say political tools—to be wielded by the district judge in much the same way as a political 
leader might seek a legislative result. 
 21.  Some MDL courts have tried to bring binding adjudication to bear outside the Rule 23 context 
through so-called “binding bellwethers.” But these attempts have met with failure in the appellate courts. 
See, e.g., In re Chevron, 109 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1997). The flaw in the binding bellwether model is that, 
without a Rule 23 analysis, the court lacks a basis to infer the homogeneity required to bind non-parties 
consistent with due process. Id. The binding bellwether, in effect, is an attempt to use the doctrine of 
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion to supplant the requirements of Rule 23. See generally, Linda S. 
Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 213, 222 (1991) (“[T]he federal appellate 
courts have effectively eliminated issue preclusion as a means of preventing the re-litigation of 
duplicative claims, except in the narrowest of circumstances. These doctrines have frustrated the ability 
of federal courts to deal with mass tort cases in an aggregative fashion, thus requiring the repetitive 
adjudication of thousands of similar claims.”). 
 22.  Eldon Fallon, Jeremy Grabill & Robert Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2332 (2008) (observing that “[t]he ultimate purpose of holding bellwether trials [is] 
not to resolve the thousands of related cases pending in the MDL . . . but instead to provide meaningful 
information and experience to everyone involved”). 
 23.  See Mihir Zaveri, Monsanto Weedkiller Was “Substantial Factor” in Causing Man’s Cancer, Jury 
Says, NEW YORK TIMES, (March 19, 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/busin 
ess/monsanto-roundup-cancer.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/K8YN-HYGV] 
(reporting on an $80 million verdict in a bellwether trial involving a plaintiff who used Roundup and 
developed stage 3 non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma); Patricia Cohen, Roundup Maker to Pay $10 Billion to 
Settle Cancer Suits, NEW YORK TIMES, (June 24, 2020) (reporting that, in the wake of the bellwether 
verdict and other jury verdicts, Bayer had agreed to “pay more than $10 billion to settle tens of thousands 
of claims while continuing to sell the product without adding warning labels about its safety”). 
 24.  See Fallon et al, supra note 22, at 2335 (reporting that, in addition to six bellwether trials held in 
the federal MDL court, “approximately 13 thirteen additional cases were tried before juries in state 
courts in New Jersey, California, Texas, Alabama, Illinois, and Florida” and that Merck won most of the 
bellwethers). Further, not all mass tort MDLs feature bellwether trials. ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, 
MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION at 27-30 (2019) 
(reporting that bellwether trials take place in only 44% of mass tort MDLs). 
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preclusive effects, the bellwether trials themselves are merely exercises yielding 
data-points for negotiators to consider.25 In the long slow dance of MDL tort 
litigation, the principals—the PSC and defense—circle round and round, 
sometimes modifying their bargaining positions in response to the occasional 
bellwether verdict, and sometimes not. 
The issue class model replaces debatable data-points with binding judgments 
on key liability issues. Where core liability questions are hotly disputed, these 
binding judgments will presumably impel defendants to improve aggregate 
settlement offers and will enhance the ability of individual plaintiffs or firms to 
try damages cases to a jury. Whether these benefits outweigh the informational 
effects of bellwether trials in any given MDL is a separate question—and one 
that might well be answered differently by judges, defendants, PSCs and 
individually retained lawyers. 
Where the benefits of issue classing are apparent, the transferee court may 
certify a standalone Rule 23(c)(4) class seeking a declaratory judgment with 
respect to certain delineated issues.26 At one time, the prevailing view was that 
declaratory judgments, as mere precursors to suits for damages or injunctions, 
were “beyond the power conferred on the federal judiciary” in the Cases or 
Controversies Clause.27 But the Supreme Court recognized in 1937 that “the 
judicial function may be appropriately exercised” in a declaratory case, “although 
the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not require the award of process 
or the payment of damages.”28 And in modern times, as Judge Posner has 
observed, the principal utility of a declaratory judgment is to serve as “a prelude 
to a request for other relief, whether injunctive or monetary.”29 
Cases seeking a judicial declaration “with respect to particular issues” may be 
“brought or maintained as a class action” under Rule 23(c)(4).30 What that 
means, in our view, is that the members of a successful issue class receive a 
judgment that operates as a sort of ticket, which the bearer may present in a court 
of competent jurisdiction and thereby establish, conclusively, the particular issue 
or element in her case for individual damages. The key to the successful operation 
of this model is crisp and clear framing of the issues presented for resolution in 
 
 25.  But see Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821, 1842 
(1995) (describing the “life cycle” of a mass tort and suggesting that plaintiffs may gain an advantage over 
time once “they have discovered sufficient information and expertise to present a credible case on 
liability, causation, and damages; have surmounted legal obstacles or made new, more favorable law; and 
have developed a second-generation offensive strategy to counter the previously successful approach of 
the defense”). 
 26.  Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, The Issue Class Revolution, 101 B.U. L. REV. 133, 151 (2021) 
(describing “the issue class action [as] a standalone vehicle for declaratory relief”). 
 27.  Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1928); see also Andrew 
Brandt, Much to Lose, Nothing to Gain, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 829 (2006). 
 28.  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937). 
 29.  Berger v. Xerox Retir. Income Guar. Plan, 338 F.3d 755, at 763 (7th Cir. 2003); see also id. at 764 
(“[a]s long as the concrete follow-on relief. . .will if ordered. . .be the direct, anticipated consequence of 
the declaration, rather than something unrelated to it, the suit can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2)”). 
 30.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(C)(4). 
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the (c)(4) trial.31 So long as the issue judgment is unequivocal and free of potential 
ambiguity, preclusion principles will apply in the follow-on proceeding. Below, 
we offer a case study in the application of these principles. 
A. The FCA MDL Issue Class 
The FCA MDL provides a beta-test for issue-classing in the setting of a mass 
tort MDL—albeit one that concerns product liability, and not personal injury, 
claims. In the FCA MDL, purchasers of certain Jeep and Chrysler vehicles filed 
cases in courts around the country, alleging serious defects relating to the gear-
shifting system. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized the 
actions in the Eastern District of Michigan before District Judge David Lawson.32 
After Judge Lawson appointed a plaintiffs’ steering committee to steward the 
litigation, the PSC sought certification of a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3). 
Judge Lawson, however, held the class not certifiable because “plaintiffs have not 
satisfied their burden of establishing the predominance of common issues over 
individual issues”—specifically, plaintiffs could not show that the element of 
reliance was susceptible to common proof.33 
Nevertheless, Judge Lawson was mindful that the defendant’s conduct in 
manufacturing and marketing automobiles does not vary from one plaintiff to 
another. Chrysler’s conduct, in other words, presents issues that are common 
across all plaintiffs. Accordingly, while no party had sought or even raised the 
possibility of issue class treatment, the court sua sponte certified a class under 
Rule 23(c)(4) to address three specific liability questions, namely: (1) “whether 
the monostable gear shift has a design defect”; (2) “whether the defendant knew 
about the defect and concealed its knowledge from buyers”; and (3) “whether 
information about the defect that was concealed would be material to a 
reasonable buyer.”34 
Judge Lawson’s questions appear well framed for purposes of generating 
preclusive findings of fact.35 The judicial declaration resulting from the Rule 
23(c)(4) trial, assuming the plaintiffs prevail, will readily be accorded binding 
effect in a subsequent damages action brought by any member of the (c)(4) class. 
 
 31.  Gilles & Friedman, supra note 4, at 1319 (“At the outset of the case, the judge [may] certify a 
(c)(4) class . . . and provide a crisp statement of the common issues to be tried in the (c)(4) trial. And at 
the close, the court [should] taken care to present clear jury interrogatories, with downstream preclusive 
effects in mind. The result would have been a piece of paper that each plaintiff could then take into her 
local trial court, entitling her to a binding declaration that certain core issues of her claim have been 
established as a matter of law.”). 
 32.  In re FCA USA LLC Monostable Elec. Gearshift Litig., 214 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (J.P.M.L. 2016). 
 33.  FCA MDL Order, supra note 8. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  In objecting to the certified issues, defendants argued that the definition of “design defect” 
varies from state to state. See Defendant FCA US LLC’S Reply Brief in support of its Motion to 
Decertify, In re FCA US LLC Monostable Elec. Gearshift Litig., MDL No. 2744 (Jun. 22, 2020), ECF 
No. 684. But even if there are, across states, several distinct verbal formulations for what constitutes a 
“design defect,” the Court can easily ask the jury if each such test was met. This strikes us as the sort of 
thing courts do every day in approving jury verdict forms. 
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By straightforward application of issue preclusion—not the Parklane Hosiery 
variety but true collateral estoppel where complete mutuality exists—the 
defendants should be fully foreclosed from relitigating design defect, knowledge, 
concealment, and objective materiality. How far that gets any given plaintiff is a 
separate question: with these predicate facts established, a verdict of liability 
might follow a fortiori in some jurisdictions, while the plaintiff in others may yet 
be required to establish individual reliance or other liability elements. But either 
way, it stands to reason that the increased availability of the trial option places 
substantial settlement pressure on the defendants—at least, in cases where key 
liability issues are seriously contested. 
B. The Lexecon Issue 
In response to the district court’s sua sponte certification of an issue class in 
the FCA MDL, the defendants moved for decertification.36 Most significantly, for 
present purposes, they argued that the MDL court lacks jurisdiction to hold a 
class-action trial, including an issue class trial, for claimants whose cases were 
transferred via 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The MDL statute, after all, only sanctions 
transfer and centralization “for pre-trial purposes” and the Supreme Court held 
in Lexecon that judges may not transfer constituent cases to themselves for trial.37 
Instead, the MDL statute provides that transferred actions “shall be remanded” 
to the court of origination before trial.38 On the defendants’ argument in the FCA 
MDL, therefore, an issue class trial could at most determine the designated issues 
for those plaintiffs whose cases were originally filed in the Eastern District of 
Michigan. 
As we write, the motion to decertify the class in the FCA MDL remains 
pending. But we do not see Lexecon principles as a serious impediment to the 
issue class model. Even if the Rule 23(c)(4) class at the issue trial were to consist 
only of plaintiffs who originally filed their cases in the MDL court, the transferred 
plaintiffs would still have compelling arguments for application of non-mutual 
offensive collateral estoppel based on the (c)(4) verdict.39 
 
 36.  Defendant FCA US LLC’s Motion to Decertify the Class, In re FCA US LLC Monostable Elec. 
Gearshift Litig., MDL 2744 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 2020). 
 37.  See Lexecon Inc. v. Millberg Weiss, 523 U.S. 26, 34 (1998) (when “pretrial proceedings have run 
their course,” Section 1407 “obligates the [MDL] Panel to remand any pending case to its originating 
court”). 
 38.  28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at . . . the 
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred . . . .”). 
 39.  More technically, in follow-on damages litigation brought by members of the (c)(4) class, the 
issue judgment would preclude re-litigation of the designated issues under the fully mutual (and usually 
nondiscretionary) version of issue preclusion. And irrespective of any state’s preclusion laws, the federal 
judgment should be accorded full faith and credit if the follow-on case is brought by a member of the 
issue class in state court. By contrast, non-members of the issue class would be left to argue for application 
of Parklane Hosiery, where the discretion of a state or federal trial court to refuse application of estoppel 
principles is greater. Nonetheless, the case for application of non-mutual issue preclusion is compelling 
in this context because, among other reasons, the defendant’s incentives and opportunities to fully and 
fairly litigate the issue were presumably high, given that the parties and the MDL court understood at 
the front end that the (c)(4) trial was intended to have broadly preclusive effects. 
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Moreover, plaintiffs can avoid the effects of Lexecon altogether by filing an 
issue class complaint in the MDL court. This issue class complaint is distinct from 
the familiar “master complaint” that a PSC typically files in mass-tort MDLs after 
transfer, and also from the superseding class action complaint that we see in the 
MDL class action context. A master complaint, often used in the mass tort arena, 
is merely an administrative device: the underlying individual tort cases, defined 
by their own individual complaints, retain their separate identities.40 The master 
complaint serves as an organizing tool that provides the transferee court a basis 
to shape discovery and consider motions across cases, including motions to 
dismiss or for summary judgment.41 Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
the filing of a master complaint in the MDL transferee court does not affect the 
separate identity of the underlying individual cases.42 
By contrast, in the class-action MDL context—for example, in antitrust or 
securities MDLs—class-action complaints purporting to represent a group, or 
groups, of plaintiffs are filed all over the country and then centralized in the MDL 
court, which then appoints class counsel and vests it with authority to file a 
superseding class action complaint. This document does not merely merge the 
constituent cases for pre-trial purposes, but fully supplants the antecedent class 
actions filed on behalf of similar groups of putative class members. Because the 
superseding class action complaint is filed in the transferee district, the MDL 
court has jurisdiction to try the class action consistent with Lexecon, no matter 
where the original class action complaints were filed. 
So, what is the upshot here for Rule 23(c)(4) issue classes inside of mass-tort 
MDLs? We think the answer is clear. After MDL transfer, the PSC should file an 
issue class complaint on behalf of all claimants. The issue class complaint is not 
merely an administrative device, but rather a real complaint that provides a basis 
for trial in the MDL court on behalf of all members of the class, as defined in the 
issue class complaint and certified by the court. But the issue class complaint is 
not a superseding complaint. It does not supplant the underlying individual cases. 
Instead, after the issue class case is tried to conclusion, those individual cases 
 
 40.  See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 454 (E.D. La. 2006) (explaining that a 
master complaint is only an administrative device that “should not be given the status of an ordinary 
complaint”); see also In re Nuvaring Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1964, 2009 WL 2425391, at *2 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 6, 2009) (same). 
 41.  For a recent example of a Master Complaint in a personal injury MDL, see Consolidated 
Consumer Class Action Complaint, In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab, Litig., MDL No. 2924 (S.D. 
Fl. June 22, 2020), ECF No. 889 (master complaint alleging that various companies involved in the 
manufacture, sale, distribution and repackaging of ranitidine failed to disclose cancer-causing 
compounds). 
 42.  In Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 413 n.3 (2015), the Court recognized that 
“[p]arties may elect to file a ‘master complaint’ and a corresponding ‘consolidated answer,’ which 
supersede prior individual pleadings. In such a case, the transferee court may treat the master pleadings 
as merging the discrete actions,” but that merger only extends “for the duration of the MDL pretrial 
proceedings.” (Citation omitted). The underlying constituent cases “retain their separate identities” and 
must be transferred back under Lexecon at the end of pretrial proceedings. Id at 413. 
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retain their force and individual identity. They may proceed as individual cases 
wherever jurisdiction permits. 
C. Other Procedural Considerations 
Returning to the FCA MDL case study for issue-classing in the MDL context, 
two additional procedural considerations warrant discussion: class certification 
and common benefit attorneys’ fees. 
First is class certification. Because issue class actions are in fact standalone 
class actions for declaratory relief, we have previously observed that they should 
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and not (b)(3).43 The hallmark of (b)(2), 
articulated by Professor Nagareda and enshrined into Supreme Court case law 
by Justice Scalia, is “the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy 
warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared 
unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”44 This test is 
always met in (c)(4) cases, where the questions relate solely to the defendant’s 
conduct. Moreover, the opt-out right that attends (b)(3) class actions makes no 
sense in the (c)(4) context. The opt-out right protects the individual plaintiff’s 
ability to control her damages case; it is not designed to insulate her from the 
application of collateral estoppel or other preclusion doctrines.45 And in the issue 
class context, the individual plaintiff has total autonomy over her damages case: 
she remains at all times free to press or settle the claim as she likes. 
Accordingly, we offer our gentle criticism of Judge Lawson’s reliance upon 
Rule 23(b)(3) in certifying the issue class in the FCA MDL. We do not contend 
that certifying the class under (b)(3) was impermissible: the court was certainly 
correct in reasoning that common questions predominate with respect to the 
certified issues, and in rejecting the view that issue class certification under (b)(3) 
requires that common questions predominate with respect to the case as a 
whole.46 But certifying under (b)(3) injects needless confusion by allowing 
plaintiffs an illusory opt-out right, the sole effect of which is to let each plaintiff 
elect whether the issue class judgment will bind him formally as a matter of issue 
preclusion or less formally as a matter of stare decisis or persuasive effect. 
Another procedural question raised by (c)(4) issue-classing concerns 
common benefit attorneys’ fees. In the FCA MDL, as in most mass tort MDLs, 
the court at an early stage approved a “common benefit protocol” that 
contemplates the PSC and its designees will perform work for the common 
 
 43.  Gilles & Friedman, supra note 26, at 145 (“The proper vehicle for certifying an issue class . . . is 
Rule 23(b)(2), which specifically authorizes for certification of class actions seeking ‘declaratory 
relief.’”). 
 44.  Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) (quoting Richard A. Nagereda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). 
 45.  Gilles & Friedman, supra note 26, at 17–18 (observing that it is not “entirely clear what the right 
to opt out of a pure declaratory judgment suit even means, or how it might work. The intended 
consequence, presumably, would be simply to exempt the opt-out from the binding preclusive effect of 
the (c)(4) judgment. But even that is not assured by the act of opting out”). 
 46.  Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal Prods. LLC, 896 F.3d 405, 413 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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benefit of all plaintiffs and, one way or another, will eventually be compensated 
for that work.47 Assessments for common benefit work are effectuated in any 
number of ways, all of which include a judicial order that draws on a court’s 
equitable powers to compel individually retained counsel in the MDL to pay a 
portion of their contingency fees to the PSC.48 In some cases, the court’s order 
will be further enshrined in the settlement agreement between the parties, with 
the defendant agreeing to pay the common benefit assessment directly into the 
common benefit fund established by the court’s order.49 In addition, the order 
creating the common benefit assessment may include fee-transfer agreements, 
where individually retained counsel sign form agreements engaging the PSC to 
perform common benefit work for a share of counsel’s contingent fee.50 
The MDL issue class complicates the question of how to compensate and 
incentivize common benefit counsel because there is no obvious mechanism to 
ensure common benefit contributions from issue class members who have no suit 
on file in the MDL, and who take the issue judgment and go file in state court. 
Nonetheless, we would not expect this problem to pose a serious disincentive to 
issue-classing, as many paths remain for common benefit counsel to be 
compensated. To the extent individual plaintiffs have cases on file in the MDL 
court, common benefit orders and fee-transfer agreements will be effective. And 
of course, if the issue-judgment drives a truly global settlement negotiated by the 
PSC, issue counsel—presumably the PSC—will be paid. Moreover, a clear order 
from the MDL court establishing the entitlement of issue class counsel to a share 
of eventual settlements and judgments ought to be accorded comity in the state 
court.51 And the MDL court can direct defendants to advise the PSC of all state 
court cases leveraging the issue class judgment, enabling issue class counsel to 
seek intervention and press an application for fees under equitable common 
benefit principles. 
 
 47.  See Pretrial Order No. 3: Protocol For Common Benefit Work And Expenses, In re FCA 
Monostable Elec. Gearshift Litig., MDL No. 2744, 16-md-02744 (E.D. Mich. November 17, 2016), ECF 
No. 17. 
 48.  See Lynn A. Baker & Stephen J. Herman, Layers of Lawyers: Parsing the Complexities of 
Claimant Representation in the Mass Tort MDL, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 469, 475 n. 17 (2020) 
(describing court orders). 
 49.  See, e.g., Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and [Plaintiff’s Counsel] at 35 § 9.2: 
Common Benefit Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Costs (Nov. 9, 2007), https://beasleyallen 
.com/wp-content/uploads/vioxx-master-settlement-agreement-with-exhibits.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV52-
MVV7]. 
 50.  For critiques of the MDL court’s authority over fees, see generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. 
L. REV. 107 (2010). 
 51.  This enforceability of a federal MDL court’s common benefit assessment on parallel state court 
proceedings has been litigated to varying results. Compare In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 764 
F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding the MDL judge lacked authority to order plaintiffs’ lawyers in state court 
suits to contribute a share of their fees to the MDL common benefit fund) with In re Avandia Mktg., 
Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 617 Fed. Appx. 136 (3d Cir. 2015) (ruling that all settled claims, in both 
MDL and state court, were subject to 7% common benefit assessment). 
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III 
THE NEGOTIATION CLASS AND THE PRESCRIPTION OPIATE MDL 
In this part, we examine the negotiation class – as conceived by Professors 
McGovern and Rubenstein and adopted by Judge Polster in the Prescription 
Opiate MDL.  At the outset, this litigation presented as a public emergency 
created by the ongoing opioid epidemic—a uniquely compelling case for pulling 
out all the stops to achieve swift resolution. In addition, the heterogeneous 
composition of the claimants—ranging from small rural fire departments to 
behemoth entities like Los Angeles County—heightened the need for a device 
that would allow PSC counsel to credibly promise that it could deliver large 
claimants in a settlement.52 The urgency and radical heterogeneity made the 
Prescription Opiate MDL an attractive vehicle for negotiation class treatment. 
But, as we show in this Part, the device proved too “adventurous” for the 
appellate court. 
A. The Prescription Opiate MDL 
In the Prescription Opiate MDL, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit rejected 
the negotiation class concept.53 The division ran deep, turning on the limits of 
judicial creativity in applying Rule 23. Judge Eric Clay’s majority opinion held 
the district court abused its discretion by adopting a procedure that “is not 
authorized by the structure, framework, or language of Rule 23.”54 Specifically, 
the court disapproved the certification of a class for a purpose other than the two 
specified in the rule—litigation and settlement. That which is not authorized 
under Rule 23, the majority reasoned, is forbidden.55 The majority parried the 
argument, advanced by plaintiffs and the district court that explicit authorization 
cannot be required for the negotiation class. After all, settlement classes were 
widely accepted by courts, including the Supreme Court, long before the 2018 
amendment that added an explicit settlement class procedure. Specifically, Judge 
Clay found a pre-amendment textual hook for the practice of certifying 
settlement classes in the longstanding language calling for “notice to class 
members of dismissal or compromise” of a class action.56 “Unlike settlement 
classes under the pre-2018 Rule,” the majority then concluded, “there is no 
textual basis” in Rule 23 “for the existence of a negotiation class.”57 
 
 52.  See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1378-79 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 5, 2017) 
(transfer order listing the myriad plaintiffs, including Native American tribes, hundreds of localities, 
hospitals, insurance companies and others). 
 53.  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664, 671–78 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 54.  Id. at 676. 
 55.  Citing Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011), and Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997), the majority opinion thus held: “The Supreme Court has also 
emphasized that we are to be ‘mindful that the Rule as now composed sets the requirements [courts] are 
bound to enforce,” that the Rule “limits judicial inventiveness,” and that “[c]ourts are not free to amend 
a rule outside the process Congress ordered.” Id. at 672. 
 56.  Id. at 673. 
 57.  Id. 
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By contrast, Judge Karen Nelson Moore’s dissent lauds the inventiveness of 
District Judge Polster—and his professorial muses—in crafting procedures 
designed to hasten global resolution of a pressing social issue. Her opinion 
delights in the “bespoke five-stage certification process [that] emerged from an 
academic chrysalis” in the work of Professors McGovern and Rubenstein.58 The 
district court, she argued, “has breathed life into a novel concept – a class certified 
for negotiation purposes – to aid in its Promethean duty to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive resolution of this byzantine multidistrict litigation.”59 Rather 
than “manacle district courts that innovate within the Rules’ textual borders,” 
Judge Moore admonishes, “we should be in the business of encouraging . . . such 
resourcefulness.”60 
It is beyond the ambition of this Article to engage the merits of the debate 
between Judge Clay and Judge Moore concerning the limits of judicial 
adventurism. But assuming the negotiation class concept is viable in the first 
instance, the question of its utility will depend in part on how courts apply Rule 
23(b)(3) in the negotiation class context. We thus focus on the class certification 
inquiry, as performed by Judge Polster and reviewed by the appellate court. 
Judge Polster certified the negotiation class in the Prescription Opiate MDL, 
holding “that common issues predominate over individualized issues with respect 
to both the [federal] RICO claims” and particular issues regarding whether 
certain defendants complied with the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). In 
certifying the class, the district court thus relied on Rule 23(b)(3) and, with 
respect to the CSA issues, (c)(4). 
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that “in certifying a negotiation class, the 
district court has papered over the predominance inquiry.”61 The main problem, 
the majority held, was that the court found only that common issues 
predominated with respect to certain federal claims or, more narrowly yet, with 
respect to certain issues, and yet the class was certified to negotiate a resolution 
of the whole case: 
[T]he court’s analysis was made incomplete by its decision to restrict its reasoning to the 
common federal claims in order to certify a negotiation class. Rule 23’s structure does 
not permit the court to evade a proper (b)(3) analysis by certifying a negotiation class 
based upon a few common federal issues, while at the same time empowering the class 
to negotiate settlement on virtually all claims brought by the class members.62 
And Rule 23(c)(4), the panel held, does not obviate the problem: “The issue class 
device permits a court to split common issues off for class treatment; it does not 
provide an end-run around the weighty requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).”63 
On the majority’s analysis, then, even if the negotiation class concept might 
otherwise be viable, class certification requires that common issues predominate 
 
 58.  Id. at 684. 
 59.  Id. at 677. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 675. 
 62.  Id. at 676. 
 63.  Id. at 675. 
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for the case as a whole. But common issues do not predominate, the majority 
held, because the overall case featured “myriad state law claims that arguably 
divide the putative class members.”64 This view of Rule 23(b)(3) is particularly 
fatal when one considers the utility of the negotiation class in mass tort MDLs, 
which are often characterized by numerous and varying issues of state law. 
B. Analyzing the Decertification 
We are skeptical of the Sixth Circuit’s Rule 23(b)(3) analysis for two reasons. 
First, to the extent that a multiplicity of divergent state law issues impacts the 
(b)(3) analysis it is because those issues render a case unmanageable. At least in 
theory, any case could be divided into multiple subclasses—one for each state, if 
necessary—which could certainly make a class action unmanageable but would 
not necessarily implicate individual issues.65 The multiplicity of state-law claims, 
fundamentally, goes to the manageability feature of (b)(3), not the predominance 
requirement. And under Amchem, the distinction is critical. Amchem holds that 
the question of whether a trial would be “manageable” under Rule 23(b)(3)(D) 
is inapplicable in the settlement context—where “the proposal is there be no 
trial”—but that the predominance requirement applies fully.66 
In the context of a class certified for the sole purpose of negotiating a 
settlement, the Rule 23(b)(3) analysis should presumably be the same as in the 
settlement class context. And yet, the Sixth Circuit majority applied the (b)(3) 
test reserved for litigation classes, by leaning heavily on manageability concerns 
that the court mislabeled as predominance issues. 
Second, even if disparate state laws were understood as a predominance 
problem, we would still question the Sixth Circuit’s application of Rule 23(b)(3). 
Here, too, the reason stems from Amchem. Unlike manageability, the 
predominance requirement applies with full force in the settlement class context. 
The reason the Court gave was that, unless a proposed settlement class is 
certifiable for trial, class counsel may well lack the leverage required to negotiate 
a fair and adequate settlement of class members’ claims.67 The deal, in other 
words, will lack the indicia of fairness afforded by adversary process. This 
rationale, however, is unpersuasive in the negotiation class context, where the 
whole point of the multi-step process is to increase plaintiffs’ leverage in other 
 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) states that “[w]hen appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses 
that are each treated as a class under this rule.” See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) 
§ 21.23 at 337 (2016) (“Subclasses must be created when differences in the positions of class members 
require separate representatives and separate counsel.”). 
 66.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 620 (1997). 
 67.  Id. at 621 (1997) (“If a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule 
23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation, both class counsel 
and court would be disarmed. Class counsel confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat 
of litigation to press for a better offer, and the court would face a bargain proffered for its approval 
without benefit of adversarial investigation.”) (citations omitted). 
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ways—not by reference to trial risk, but by solving collective action problems and 
enabling class counsel to present defendants with a global deal package. 
Finally, before turning to a discussion of the relative attributes of the issue 
class and negotiation class models, we pause to consider the district court’s 
treatment of issue-classing in the Prescription Opiate MDL. In our view, the 
district court’s invocation of Rule 23(c)(4) in certifying a negotiation class was 
badly misplaced. It may be that a class is certifiable under Rule 23(a) and (b) not 
only for litigation or settlement, but for negotiation as well—this is the nub of the 
division among the Sixth Circuit panel members. But (c)(4) is, by necessity, 
specific to the litigation context. Judge Polster did not certify a class of plaintiffs 
to go negotiate with defendants over whether their conduct met the standards of 
care set forth in the CSA. He certified a class to negotiate the resolution of claims. 
Accordingly, Judge Polster could certainly certify the CSA issues—and 
probably multiple other issues as well—for a Rule 23(c)(4) trial. What is more, if 
a negotiation class is otherwise viable under (b)(3), the court could order an issue 
class trial while the negotiation class is seeking resolution. Such a combined 
approach could well hasten the global resolution the negotiation class was 
designed to pursue—although not without some perverse effects.68 But whatever 
the interplay between the issue class and the negotiation class, it should be clear 
that (c)(4) is not an avenue to certification of a class for negotiation purposes.69 
IV 
THE ISSUE CLASS, THE NEGOTIATION CLASS AND THE STATUS QUO 
The MDL issue class, as we have conceived it, and the negotiation class 
proposed by Professors McGovern and Rubenstein both look to Rule 23 to help 
solve problems in mass tort MDLs. Both are concerned with decoagulating the 
MDL system. “Growing dockets have long been the mother of judicial 
invention,” declares a recent article on the negotiation class idea.70 And the quest 
for invention seems well-founded. More than half of all private civil lawsuits are 
 
 68.  Specifically, we have regarded it as a virtue of the issue class model that it promotes litigant 
autonomy, because the individual litigant armed with the issue judgment is well equipped to pursue her 
separate damages claim. Introducing a negotiation class into this equation, on the McGovern-Rubenstein 
model, would eliminate this core benefit by forcing the individual plaintiff to exercise or forfeit her opt-
out right at an early stage. Assuming she does not opt out of the negotiation class, can she later take a 
favorable issue class judgment into state court to pursue damages? Does that depend on whether the 
effort to negotiate global resolution is unsuccessful? And if so, shouldn’t the model provide for a formal 
declaration of impasse, liberating individual class members to pursue their separate claims? To say the 
least, these waters are uncharted. 
 69.  Given the 6th Circuit decision decertifying the negotiation class, this may be the last we see of 
this innovative effort. In any event, we think the negotiation class would be of limited utility in quotidian 
physical injury MDLs where defendants are able to reach comprehensive resolution of mass claims via 
settlements with each of the (typically) thirty or so firms representing the bulk of plaintiffs —without 
resorting to barring the exit doors. 
 70.  Francis McGovern, Elizabeth Burch & William Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class, 104 
JUDICATURE 1, 12 (Spring 2020), https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/the-negotiation-class/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LWR2-LHUK]. 
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within MDLs, according to recent research.71 And because mass-tort MDLs are 
so populous, “quite a few judges” have come to “view the MDL process as a 
crucible for inventiveness,” in Professor McGovern’s words.72 The problem 
motivating this judicial creativity is not so much size as stasis—the perception 
reflected in the oft-repeated quip that “multi-district litigation is like the old 
Roach Motel ad: ‘Roaches check in – but they don’t check out.’”73 
So, what are the benefits and detriments of the issue class model—relative 
both to the negotiation class and status quo bellwether-centric models—when 
viewed from the distinct perspectives of the defendants, plaintiffs, and MDL 
courts? We begin with the defense. While the negotiation class and the issue class 
share little beyond reliance on Rule 23, that is apparently sufficient to draw 
charges of judicial adventurism from defendants with regard to both. In the FCA 
MDL, the defendants wasted no time invoking the Prescription Opiate MDL to 
argue that Judge Lawson’s certification of an issue class exceeds the bounds of 
permissible judicial creativity, contending the court was focused on “improving 
the ‘efficiency’ of an MDL” at the expense of the “showing required by Rule 
23.”74 But we think the judicial adventurism objection to the use of (c)(4) in mass 
tort MDLs is unlikely to gain traction. Whatever the merits of the panel-
majority’s view in the Prescription Opiate MDL that procedures not specifically 
identified in Rule 23 are prohibited, the issue class procedure is specifically 
anchored in the text. And yet, we expect that defendants will continue to reach 
for conservative objections to issue-classing—if not because the procedure is 
unauthorized then because it is presumably radical in some other sense. 
The specific objection we expect from the defense side harkens back to 
Rhone-Poulenc, where Judge Posner warned of the in terrorem effects of class 
certification in the mass tort context—the idea that a certified class presents such 
a massive threat that defendants will rationally be forced to settle even 
unmeritorious cases.75 While these concerns have been widely criticized as 
unmoored from Rule 23,76 some courts have recognized “hydraulic pressure on 
 
 71.  See Baker & Herman, supra note 48, at 470. 
 72.  McGovern, Burch & Rubenstein, supra note 70, at 17. 
 73. See e.g., In re TJX Companies Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 405 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(attributing quote to Samuel Issacharoff); In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-
02323-AB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4318, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2019); Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 150 
F. Supp. 3d 53, 66 n.29 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 74.  Defendant FCA US LLC’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Decertify at 1, In re FCA 
US LLC Monostable Elec. Gearshift Litigation, No. 16-md-02744 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 2020) (quoting In 
re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 856 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2020) (decision certifying appeal under 
Rule 23(f))). 
 75.  In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that issue 
class certification may impose “intense pressure to settle” in order avoid massive potential liability and 
possible bankruptcy at the hands of a single jury entrusted with “the fate of an entire industry”). 
 76.  Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1357, 1430 (2003) (“Given the sad state of the duress theory, judges hardly are justified in using it at all, 
let alone in employing incendiary phrases like legalized blackmail. The hard work of thinking the theory 
through has not been done. Judges should focus on this aspect of the project and leave the task of 
demonizing plaintiffs, trial lawyers, and trial judges to others.”); Jeffrey Stempel, Class Actions and 
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defendants to settle” as a factor “which weighs in the superiority analysis’” 
prescribed by (b)(3).77 Another textual hook for the in terrorem objection, 
specific to issue classes, is found in (c)(4)’s language permitting issue classes 
“[w]hen appropriate”—a standard that is surely mushy enough to accommodate 
the in terrorem objection. 
And yet, the in terrorem effects argument is uniquely weak in the issue class 
context. If class certification exerts overwhelming pressure to settle, that pressure 
hales from the aggregation of all damages claims—that is, from the fact that the 
defendant, if it loses, will incur liability to all victims, including those who would 
never have sued. This font of pressure is specific to Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes 
and is plainly absent in the issue class context. So, we would expect the objection 
to carry even less weight in (c)(4) cases than it does in damages classes generally. 
A closely related argument against issue classing and in favor of the status 
quo ante is that the stakes of a single winner-take-all mass-tort issues trial are too 
high for the plaintiffs as well as the defendants. While defendants frame their 
concerns in terms of in terrorem effects, the plaintiffs will complain that they get 
better at trying their case over time, and a one-time showdown pretermits their 
learning curve at an early stage.78 
We question whether it is plausible that plaintiffs get better at prosecuting the 
claim and yet defendants do not get better at defending it. We also question why 
a court would care. And the objection that the stakes are too high for a single 
trial should be unmoving, given that courts hold hugely consequential trials all 
the time—from bet-the-company intellectual property cases to antitrust class 
actions and capital murder cases. These trials are also single-shot affairs; like the 
Super Bowl, they are not structured as best-of-seven series. Courts afford the 
parties all the discovery and process that is due and then hold a single trial for all 
the marbles. Why mass tort should be any different is not clear. 
Nor should the other objections that we attributed earlier to PSCs carry 
weight with the MDL court. First, the argument that bifurcation depresses 
aggregate recoveries ought not be a concern to the MDL judge. Putting aside 
whether the magnitude of aggregate recovery is a proper concern for courts in 
the first instance—and we would allow that it could be, as a proxy for aggregate 
deterrence—the specific concern that bifurcation depresses recoveries is 
particularly weak when directed to the court. In certifying an issue class, the MDL 
judge will understand that the court overseeing a subsequent damages trial will 
only exclude liability evidence if it is unduly prejudicial. And it is unclear why the 
 
Limited Vision: Opportunities for Improvement Through a More Functional Approach to Class Treatment 
of Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127, 1229 (2005) (observing that those asserting the “extortionate impact 
of class treatment” are “long on rhetoric and the ‘cosmic anecdote’ . . . [and that] the ‘litigation 
blackmail’ argument against class treatment is essentially a Potemkin village[:] It has an initial superficial 
persuasiveness but upon closer inspection appears to be an illusion”). 
 77.  In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 430, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 78.  See McGovern, supra note 25. 
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MDL court should take steps to ensure the damages jury hears prejudicial 
evidence. 
More broadly, there is little reason to believe the objectives of the court are 
better served by the current bellwether-centric regime than by issue classing. In 
terms of fostering prompt resolution, we would expect issue-classing to 
outperform bellwether practice. To be sure, when bellwether juries return 
repeated blockbuster verdicts, defendants will presumably be moved to proffer 
aggregate settlement proposals with docket-clearing potential, as we saw recently 
in the Roundup MDL.79 But such outcomes do not appear to be the norm; more 
often, results are mixed. In the Vioxx MDL, for example, there were sixteen trials 
involving seventeen plaintiffs at the federal and state levels, spanning the course 
of more than a decade.80 The power of the bellwether tool to clear congested 
MDL dockets, then, appears sporadic. 
The issue class likewise looks to clear dockets by increasing aggregate 
settlement prospects, but it does so systematically, not sporadically. The expected 
value of a settlement, at the broadest level, is the product of two variables—the 
probability of winning and the dollar-value of a win. In cases where the certified 
issue is fully determinative of liability, the issue class trial will set the probability 
level for negotiators at either one-hundred percent or zero.81 Of course, to the 
extent the certified issues are less than dispositive on the question of liability, 
these values will be correspondingly less absolute. But still, establishing clear 
answers to hotly contested liability questions will presumably have a profound 
impact on expected value. 
On the axis of time, moreover, the issue class has considerable advantages 
over the bellwether model. All else being equal, we would expect the issue class 
trial to take less time than a single bellwether, let alone multiple bellwethers. The 
issue class trial, after all, excludes individual-plaintiff-focused issues, which 
comprise a substantial portion of the trial time in any bellwether case. By 
prioritizing the issue class proceeding, moreover, the MDL court can ensure that 
no individual-plaintiff-focused discovery or motion practice impedes the onset of 
the issue class trial. And while the issue class trial is likely to be heavily litigated, 
given the high stakes, the same is true for bellwethers, where the participants are 
acutely aware that the trial has ramifications that go beyond the individual 
 
 79.  In re: Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741 (S.D. Ill.); see Patricia Cohen, Roundup 
Maker to Pay $10 Billion to Settle Cancer Suits, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/06/24/business/roundup-settlement-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/6UWZ-L3Z6] (reporting that, 
in the wake of the bellwether verdict and other jury verdicts, Bayer had agreed to “pay more than $10 
billion to settle tens of thousands of claims while continuing to sell the product without adding warning 
labels about its safety”). 
 80.  The Vioxx litigation ran for over a decade, and the docket contains over 65,600 entries. In re 
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La.). 
 81.  As we have explained elsewhere, if the certified issues do not go a substantial distance towards 
establishing liability, then the case is generally a poor candidate for issue class treatment. See Gilles & 
Friedman, supra note 26, at 110–11. 
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parties.82 On the flip side, the issue class procedure will cost the MDL court time, 
to the extent that class certification decisions are appealed. But given the 
straightforward class certification analysis (whether under Rule 23(b)(2) or the 
“broad view” of (b)(3)),83 we would expect few applications for appellate review 
to be granted under Rule 23(f)—at least once the device no longer appears novel 
to circuit courts. 
Finally, we speculated above that some PSCs might be concerned that the 
issue class procedure impedes aggregate resolutions because the issue verdict 
could embolden individually retained lawyers to decline offers to settle their 
portfolios of cases. But if this is a concern—and we don’t know that it is—we 
question whether it is a concern the court should be expected to share. From a 
policy perspective, is it a virtue or a vice that the issue class procedure increases 
the plaintiff’s access to trials and concomitant bargaining leverage? And from the 
more parochial perspective of MDL docket management, is it a welcome 
development if individual law firms, with portfolios of clients attached, decamp 
for their courts of origin, or state courts, to try or settle their cases? 
The negotiation class and issue class are based on diametrically opposing 
answers to these questions. The negotiation class proceeds from the premise that 
the ability of individual plaintiffs—or groups of plaintiffs—to decline settlement 
and pursue their cases is an obstacle to the goal of clearing dockets. The 
negotiation class can succeed only if claimants are convinced to surrender their 
autonomy at the front end. If large claimants exercise their front-end opportunity 
to opt out—which it seems to us they likely would, in order to preserve their 
bargaining leverage84—then the negotiation class fails. But if they are willing to 
surrender their otherwise-inherent veto power over any offer made to them, as a 
trade-off for fielding a global proposal, then the negotiation-class device has the 
potential to clear mass-tort MDL dockets with an efficacy that issue-classing and 
status quo bellwether practice cannot match. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The negotiation class abjures adjudicatory processes in favor of an essentially 
political procedure aimed specifically at negotiated resolution. The status quo 
bellwether regime employs adjudication, but only in the service of settlement 
 
 82.  See, e.g., Fallon et al., supra note 22, at 2366 (observing that “bellwether trials are often 
exponentially more expensive for the litigants and attorneys than a normal trial. . .as coordinating counsel 
often pull out all the stops for bellwether trials given the raised stakes”). 
 83.  Gilles & Friedman, supra note 26, at 113 (describing the debate among commentators and courts 
on whether (b)(3) demands that common issues predominate for the damages class action as a whole (the 
so-called “narrow view”), or only with respect to the issue for which issue class treatment is sought (the 
“broad view”)). 
 84.  While the negotiation class procedure approved by Judge Polster nominally holds open the 
possibility that the court will allow a second opt-out right at the time of settlement, it is hard to imagine 
the parties or the court would seriously consider that option. A second opt-out right would seemingly 
undermine the entire model, which is based on foreclosing exit by large stakeholders. 
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negotiations, where negotiators’ positions are informed by bellwether trial 
results, among other inputs. 
The issue class model, by contrast, revolves around adjudication. It forces the 
parties to present their best case and looks to the jury to find facts and apply facts 
to law. It does not spurn aggregate settlement as a goal but ensures that any 
subsequent resolution is informed by a binding ruling on key liability issues—one 
that occurred in public and that forms a part of the common law. The decisions 
of individual plaintiffs whether to sign onto an agreement—and the decisions of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys whether to settle their portfolios of cases—are informed by 
the issue class judgment. 
Whether the adjudication-centricity of the issue class model makes it superior 
to the other modes of dispute resolution is a normative question. But we would 
argue the system as a whole has a stake in ensuring that negotiated resolutions 
are relatively more influenced by the facts and law, and relatively less by sources 
of leverage that are exogenous to the merits—whether that is the perceived 
wherewithal of individually retained counsel to prosecute its portfolio of cases, 
or the perceived ability of a PSC to deliver large claimants in a universal 
settlement package. 
So, with all that said, what are the prospects that MDL courts will turn to 
issue-classing as a way to alleviate docket congestion in mass-tort cases? It may 
just be a matter of time. Rhone-Poulenc and Castano are no longer good law and 
the inertial ripples they sent across the waters of mass tort practice won’t go on 
forever.85 Prior to Rhone-Poulenc, many judges were using the issue class tool in 
mass tort cases—and doing so at the urging of plaintiffs’ counsel.86 And even in 
the years since, there have been some savvy PSC counsel that have tried to certify 
issue classes in mass tort MDLs, including in Vioxx, where the application only 
failed because the district court was bound by Castano.87 Whether PSCs will come 
 
 85.  See Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1126–28 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting 
Rhone-Poulenc’s Seventh Amendment analysis); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 806–07 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (reversing Castano’s predominance analysis). See also Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 
1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting Castano’s ‘mature torts’ analysis); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 
F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Castano’s predominance analysis). 
 86. As Judge Weinstein observed, before Rhone-Poulenc and Castano became entrenched, 
numerous courts had found Rule 23(c)(4)(A) “particularly useful in the mass tort context.” Simon v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 29–30 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Valentino, 97 F.3d at 
1230–314; Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473–74 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming class action 
plan involving trial of common factual issues regarding health hazards of asbestos, to be followed by 
individual damages cases); In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 461 (D. Wyo. 1995) (“[T]his Court 
finds Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4)(A) a highly efficient way to preserve both judicial economy and the rights of 
the parties in the case.”); see also Susan E. Abitanta, Bifurcation of Liability and Damages in Rule 
23(b)(3) Class Actions: History, Policy, Problems, and a Solution, 36 SW. L.J. 743, 753 (1982) 
(“The . . . economies of handling as much as possible of the complex case in one proceeding prompt the 
courts whenever possible to structure the action through rule 23(c)(4)(A) to achieve a manageable 
suit.”). 
 87.  In Vioxx, the PSC argued that the court had the “ability to determine particular issues during 
the trial,” under (c)(4), and thereby produce “res judicata effect” for class members. Plaintiffs’ Steering 
Committee’s Motion for Certification of a Nation-Wide Class Action for Personal Injury and Wrongful 
Death, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006) (MDL No. 1657), 2005 WL 
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to embrace issue-classing more generally, or whether MDL judges drive the 
process on their own, as Judge Lawson has in the FCA MDL, the prospects 
appear to us good that issue-classing will emerge as a significant tool in the 




3487961, at *18. However, because the court was bound by the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Castano, the PSC 
acknowledged that it was constrained to argue that the Vioxx case as a whole satisfied Rule 23(b)(3). See 
id. at *18 n.19. Relying on Castano, the district court then denied certification on the grounds that 
individual issues predominated with respect to the case as a whole. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 
F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006). 
